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Abstract 
 
Financialization is a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions and 
financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes. 
Financialization transforms the functioning of economic system at both the macro and 
micro levels.  
Its principal impacts are to (1) elevate the significance of the financial sector 
relative to the real sector; (2) transfer income from the real sector to the financial sector; 
and (3) increase income inequality and contribute to wage stagnation. Additionally, there 
are reasons to believe that financialization may render the economy prone to risk of debt-
deflation and prolonged recession.  
Financialization operates through three different conduits: changes in the structure 
and operation of financial markets; changes in the behavior of non-financial corporations, 
and changes in economic policy.  
Countering financialization calls for a multi-faceted agenda that (1) restores 
policy control over financial markets, (2) challenges the neo-liberal economic policy 
paradigm encouraged by financialization, (3) makes corporations responsive to interests 
of stakeholders other than just financial markets, and (4) reforms the political process so 
as to diminish the influence of corporations and wealthy elites.  
 
Keywords: Financialization, neo-liberal policy, deregulation, debt, financial fragility.  
JEL ref.: B50, E44, E60 
 
 
 
Paper presented at a conference on “Finance-led Capitalism? Macroeconomic Effects of Changes in the 
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I Financialization : what it is and why it is of concern 
This paper explores the construct of “financialization,” which Epstein (2001) 
defines as follows: 
“Financialization refers to the increasing importance of financial markets, 
financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation 
of the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and 
international level (Epstein 2001, p.1).” 
 
The paper focuses on the US economy, which is where financialization seems to be most 
developed. However, judging by the increase in rentier income shares, financialization 
appears to have infected all industrialized economies (Power, Epstein & Abrena, 2003; 
Jayadev and Epstein, 2007). 
Financialization transforms the functioning of the economic system at both the 
macro and micro levels. Its principal impacts are to (1) elevate the significance of the 
financial sector relative to the real sector; (2) transfer income from the real sector to the 
financial sector; and (3) contribute to increased income inequality and wage stagnation.  
Financialization raises public policy concerns at both the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic levels. At the macro level, the era of financialization has been associated 
with tepid real economic growth, and growth also appears to show a slowing trend.1 
There are also indications of increased financial fragility. Internationally, fragility was 
evident in the run of financial crises that afflicted the global economy in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, and it has surfaced again in the recent US sub-prime mortgage crisis that 
spread to Europe.  
Furthermore, there are serious reservations about the sustainability of the 
financialization process. The last two decades have been marked by rapidly rising 
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household debt-income ratios and corporate debt-equity ratios. These developments 
explain both the system’s growth and increasing fragility, but they also indicate 
unsustainability because debt constraints must eventually bite. The risk is when this 
happens the economy could be vulnerable to debt-deflation and prolonged recession. 
These macroeconomic concerns are compounded by concerns about income 
distribution. Thus, the era of financialization has witnessed a disconnection of wages 
from productivity growth, raising serious concerns regarding wage stagnation and 
widening income and wealth inequality (Mishel et al., 2007). 
 The financialization thesis is that these changes in macroeconomic patterns and 
income distribution are significantly attributable to financial sector developments. Those 
developments have relaxed constraints on access to finance and increased the influence of 
the financial sector over the non-financial sector. For households this has enabled greatly 
increased borrowing. For non-financial firms, it has contributed to changes in firm 
behavior. When combined with changes in economic policy that have been supported by 
financial and non-financial business elites, these developments have changed the broader 
character and performance of the economy. 
II Financialization and conventional economic theory 
Conventional economic theory has played an important role promoting 
financialization. One area where theory has been especially important is the formulation 
of the relationship between firms and financial markets in terms of an agency problem 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) whereby the challenge is to get the firm’s managers to 
maximize profits on behalf of shareholders. This representation has had important 
                                                                                                                                                 
1  Stockhammer (2007) has documented that growth in the EU has also been tepid over the past twenty-five 
years during the era of financialization. 
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consequences. First, the agency approach envisages the solution to the corporate 
governance problem as one of aligning the interests of managers with those of financial 
market participants. That has been used to rationalize the explosion in top management 
compensation and stock option grants, and it has also been used to justify the rise of the 
takeover movement and private equity investment. Second, the agency approach 
promotes a legal view whereby the sole purpose of corporations - which are a societal 
construction - is to maximize shareholder returns within the confines of the law. That has 
served to restrict the focus of policy discussion to how to give shareholders greater 
control over managers. Meanwhile, broader questions regarding the purpose of 
corporations and the interest of other stakeholders have been kept completely off the 
policy table. 
Conventional economic theory has also lent support for financialization, by 
arguing that the expansion of financial markets enhances economic efficiency. This 
rationale draws from Arrow and Debreu’s (1954) construction of financial assets as 
contingent claims. According to this view, expanding the scope of financial markets and 
the range of financial assets increases efficiency by expanding the states of nature 
spanned by financial instruments. This enables markets to better price future economic 
outcomes, improves the ex-ante allocation of resources across future contingent 
economic conditions, and helps agents assemble portfolios that provide better returns and 
risk coverage.2
Conventional theory has also tended to dismiss problems of financial speculation 
                                                 
2 One caveat to this argument is from second-best best theory. If markets are incomplete, expanding the 
number of markets can theoretically worsen outcomes by increasing the returns to distorted trades, thereby 
amplifying their volume. However, this is a theoretical possibility and there is no a priori reason to believe 
that this will actually happen. 
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using Friedman’s (1953) argument that speculation is stabilizing. According to Friedman, 
market prices are set on the basis of economic fundamentals. When prices diverge from 
those fundamentals that creates a profitable opportunity. Speculators then step in and buy 
or sell, driving prices back to the level warranted by fundamentals.  
Increasing the number of traders and volume of trading is also regarded as 
improving financial market outcomes. Increased trade volume increases market liquidity 
so that market prices are less susceptible to small random disturbances or manipulation 
by individual market participants.  
Lastly, macroeconomic theory has also supported this optimistic view of financial 
markets through q-theory (Brainard and Tobin, 1977). “q” represents the ratio of the 
market price of capital to its replacement cost, and the q-ratio supposedly provides firms 
with a signal that efficiently directs investment and capital accumulation. Thus, when q is 
greater than unity, the market price exceeds the replacement cost. That sends a signal that 
capital is in short supply and profitable investment opportunities are available, and firms 
respond by investing. 
As always, there is some mainstream literature challenging these conclusions, and 
that literature is growing with the emergence of the behavioral finance approach. For 
instance, rational expectations theory (Flood and Garber, 1980) acknowledges that 
market participants can rationally participate in bubbles if they have expectations of 
rising prices. The noise trader literature initiated by De Long et al. (1990) argues that 
risk-neutral speculators who trade purely on noise can generate market inefficiency if 
other traders are risk averse. Hirshleifer (1971) argues that financial market activity can 
be socially wasteful if the activity is the result of divergent subjectively held beliefs, 
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making it more akin to betting at a racecourse than productive investment. In this case the 
race uses valuable economic resources but produces nothing. Lastly, Crotty (1990) and 
Palley (2001) have criticized the logic of q-theory, arguing it erroneously conflates the 
behaviors and expectations of managers with those of shareholders and the reality is 
stock market signals to invest can be highly inefficient. 
However, these within paradigm critiques of financial market activity have been 
more akin to bubbles on a stream. That is they show financial markets can generate 
inefficient outcomes according to conventional theory, but these critiques have had little 
impact on either broad thinking about financial markets or the direction of policy, both of 
which remain driven by belief that deregulation and expansion of financial markets is 
welfare enhancing.  
Most importantly, these critiques of financial markets are generated from within 
the conventional paradigm so that they remain structured by that paradigm. 
Consequently, financial markets are assessed in terms of the neo-classical allocative 
efficiency paradigm, rather than being seen as part of an economic system that distributes 
power and affects the character of production and the distribution of income. The 
construct of financialization remedies this failing. 
III The anatomy of financialization  
The defining feature of financialization in the U.S. has been an increase in the 
volume of debt. Using peak business cycle years for purposes of control, Table 1 shows 
the evolution of total credit market debt outstanding between 1973 and 2005.3 During 
this period, total debt rose from 140 to 328.6 percent of GDP. Financial sector debt also 
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grew much faster than non-financial sector debt, so that financial sector debt rose from 
9.7 to 31.5 percent of total debt over the same period. 1979 appears to mark a break 
point, with financial sector debt increasing much more rapidly relative to non-financial 
sector debt thereafter. 
Table 2 provides an analysis of non-financial sector debt by type of credit. 
Consumer revolving credit is stripped out because its evolution largely reflects changes in 
payments technology (i.e. increased use of credit cards) rather than fundamental changes 
in indebtedness. Column 6 shows that between 1973 and 2005 non-financial sector debt-
x-revolving credit grew significantly faster than GDP, rising from 136.3 percent to 189.5 
percent of GDP. Column 8 shows the mortgage component has risen especially rapidly, 
rising from 48.7 percent to 97.5 percent of GDP.  This increase in mortgage debt has 
been especially sharp in the period 2000 – 2005, reflecting the U.S. house price bubble. 
Table 3 provides another analysis of non-financial sector debt, this time by type of 
borrower. The striking feature about this table is the extraordinary rise in household 
sector debt. Columns 6 and 7 show that both non-financial corporate and household 
sector debt rose sharply relative to GDP, with the break happening in 1979. However. 
household sector debt has risen far faster, as evidenced in column 9 which shows its 
increasing share of total domestic non-financial debt. The relatively more rapid growth of 
household debt started after 1989. In the 1980s the debt growth increased in both the 
household and non-financial corporate sector, but at a fairly similar rate. Since, 1989 debt 
has continued growing in all sectors, but it has been growing far faster in the household 
sector. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 The years 1973, 1979, 1989, and 2000 correspond to peak years of the business cycle, thereby providing 
peak-to-peak comparisons that facilitate comparison across business cycles. 2005 is not the peak of the 
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Turning to the real economy, Table 4 shows the growing importance of the 
financial sector in the U.S. economy. Between 1979 and 2005, the contribution of the 
finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector to GDP rose from 15.2 percent to 20.4 
percent. Table 5 shows that at the same time, FIRE employment as a share of total private 
sector employment rose from 6.6 percent to 7.3 percent.  
At the macroeconomic level the era of financialization has been associated with 
generally tepid economic growth. Table 6 show the growth of per capita income in the 
major industrialized countries over the period 1960 – 2004. In all countries except the 
U.K., average annual growth fell during the era of financialization that set in after 1979. 
Additionally, growth also appears to show a slowing trend so that growth in the 1980s 
was higher than in the 1990s, which in turn was higher than in the 2000s. 
 Table 7 shows data on U.S. gross investment spending as a share of GDP, and 
there appears to be a downward trend post-1979. The current business cycle is marked by 
particular weakness in investment spending, and given the surge in residential 
investment, that means business investment spending has been especially weak. 
These headline changes in levels of debt and the composition of macroeconomic 
activity have been accompanied by changes in the evolution of wages and the distribution 
of income. Figure 1 shows how wages of US production and non-supervisory workers 
(who constitute over 80 percent of employment) have become detached from productivity 
growth during the era of financialization. From 1959 – 1979 wages grew roughly in line 
with productivity, but thereafter the two have diverged with wages flat-lining while 
productivity has continued growing.  
This stagnation of wages has been accompanied by rising income inequality. 
                                                                                                                                                 
current business cycle but reflects latest available data. 
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Mishel et al. (2007) report that in 1979 the income of the top five percent of families was 
11.4 times the income of the bottom twenty percent of families. By 2004 this ratio had 
risen to 20.7 times. 
 Economists have identified multiple factors behind the stagnation of wages and 
the growth of income inequality (Palley, 1998a; Gordon and Dew-Becker, 2007; Levy 
and Temin, 2007). Those factors include the erosion of unions, the minimum wage, and 
labor market solidarity; globalization and trade; immigration; skill-biased technical 
change; and rising CEO pay supposedly driven by the logic of the economics of 
superstars. However, such analysis tends to treat these factors as independent of each 
other. The financialization thesis maintains that many of these factors should be linked 
and interpreted as part of a new economic configuration that has been explicitly promoted 
by financial sector interests. 
The stagnation of wages and changes in personal income distribution has been 
accompanied by changes in the functional distribution of income, and these latter changes 
spotlight the role of financialization. Figure 2 shows the national income tree that 
describes how national income can be broken down into payments as wages and capital 
income. Wages can be decomposed into payments to managers and workers, while 
capital incomes can be decomposed into profit and interest payments, and profit can be 
decomposed into financial and non-financial sector profits.  
Table 8 shows the evolution of corporate profits before interest relative to 
employee compensation. Profits and interest rose from 22.3 percent of employee 
compensation in 1973 to 25.8 percent in 2005, indicating a shift of income away from 
labor to capital. 
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Table 9 provides data on corporate profits and interest payments. From 1973 to 
1989 interest payments rose from 44 percent to 101.3 percent of profits, indicating a 
change in the composition of payments to capital and the high interest rates that prevailed 
in the 1980s owing to Federal Reserve policy. However, by 2005 corporate interest 
payments had fallen back to 36.3 percent reflecting the low interest rates that have 
prevailed in the 2000s and the surge in corporate profits after 2003.  
Lastly, Table 10 shows the division of domestic corporate profits between the 
financial and non-financial sector. Between 1973 and 2005 total profits rose from 7.3 
percent to 10.3 percent of GDP. The financial sectors share of profits has risen especially 
strongly. In 1973 financial sector corporate profits were 25.7 percent of non-financial 
corporate profits, but by 2000 they had risen to 49.7 percent. This has fallen back to 43.2 
percent in 2005 owing to the recent strong rise in non-financial corporate profits. 
In sum, the era of financialization has been marked by (1) a slight shift in income 
toward capital; (2) a change in the composition of payments to capital that has increased 
the interest share; and (3) an increase in the financial sector’s share of total profits. 
Turning to the composition of the wage share, no formal data exists on its division 
between managerial and workers wages. However, available evidence suggests there has 
been a shift in the wage share from workers to managers. Mishel at al. (2007) report that 
CEO pay has exploded from thirty-eight times average worker pay in 1979 to two 
hundred and sixty-two times worker pay in 2005. Bebchuck and Grinstein (2005) report 
that pay for the top five officers of S&P 500 companies rose from 5 percent of corporate 
profits in the 1990s to over 10 percent in the 2000s. Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) 
report that over the period 1966 – 2001 only the top ten percent of the income distribution 
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(which presumably includes the managerial class) had real compensation growth equal to 
or above productivity growth. Additionally, Mishel et al. (2007) report that among 
workers there has been an increase in wage inequality, with wages of higher paid workers 
in the top half of the wage distribution rising much faster than those in the bottom half of 
the wage distribution. 
IV Conduits of Financialization 
The financialization thesis is that these developments regarding increased debt, 
changes in the functional distribution of income, wage stagnation, and increased income 
inequality are significantly due to changes wrought by financial sector interests. These 
changes concern the structure of the economy, economic policy, and the behavior of 
corporations. 
The mechanics of financialization are illustrated in Figure 3, which shows how 
the influence of financial sector interests work through three distinct conduits. The first 
conduit concerns the structure and operation of financial markets. The second conduit 
concerns the behavior of non-financial corporations, while the third conduit concerns 
economic policy. Though not shown in the diagram for reasons of simplicity, these 
conduits also interact so that economic policy affects the structure of financial markets 
and changes corporate behavior. 
Changes in the structure and operation of financial markets  
The macroeconomic impacts of financial markets have been a traditional focus of 
macroeconomists. Financialization has changed the structure and operation of financial 
markets, and most existing theoretical studies of financialization examine how these 
changes (particularly regarding credit availability) impact macroeconomic outcomes and 
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the business cycle. A sense of this work can be gained from the following brief (and non-
exhaustive) survey. 
Some of the earliest work relevant to financialization concerned the effects of 
changing the menu of financial assets and liabilities (Tobin, 1961) and the 
macroeconomic effects of financial innovation and deregulation (Tobin and Brainard, 
1963). Another early channel of inquiry was the impact of wealth and credit rationing on 
household consumption (Ackley, 1951; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Modigliani and 
Ando, 1963). Tobin’s q-theory (Brainard and Tobin, 1977) emphasized the influence of 
the stock market on business investment spending. 
This early work on the macroeconomic effects of financial markets tended to 
ignore credit and debt, which has become the focus of current work on financialization. 
Minsky (1982) has been especially influential with his psychological theory of the 
business cycle that has agents borrowing and bidding up asset prices to unsupportable 
levels that is then followed by a crash. Additionally, there has been a resurgence of 
interest in Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation theory of recessions, which links with the long-
standing debate in Keynesian economics whether price level adjustment can restore full 
employment in a monetary economy with nominal debt (Tobin, 1980; Caskey and 
Fazzari, 1987; Palley, 1999, 2007a).  
Minsky’s (1982) construction of the business cycle has considerable similarities 
with the theory of the financial accelerator developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1996). 
However, Minsky places greater emphasis on subjective psychological forces and 
speculation. Financial accelerator theory emphasizes asset price inflation that raises 
collateral values, which allows more borrowing that finances investment spending and 
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drives economic expansion. However, eventually firms’ balance sheets become 
congested so that borrowing and investment fall, setting off a downturn in which asset 
prices fall. Credit constraints then tighten, causing a cumulative spiral downward 
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).  
The financial accelerator, which might also be termed the “balance sheet 
congestion” approach, has now become the major workhorse for theoretical enquiry into 
the macroeconomic effects of financialization. The focus is on how changes in financial 
markets affect collateral values and credit availability, thereby relaxing corporate balance 
sheet constraints and potentially making for more volatile and longer business cycles that 
may even be unstable. 
Additionally, there is a specifically Post Keynesian line of inquiry that 
emphasizes the impact of debt on income distribution and aggregate demand (Palley, 
1994, 1996a, 1997a). This Post Keynesian approach emphasizes how debt transfers 
income from high marginal propensity to spend debtors to lower marginal propensity to 
spend creditors, and this process of transfer can generate business cycles. However, this 
line of enquiry emphasizing income distribution effects has been ignored by the 
mainstream, which has instead chosen to focus on the corporate balance sheet congestion 
mechanism. 
 Finally, there is an emerging Post Keynesian literature that seeks to examine the 
effects of financialization on long run growth (Dutt, 2005; Palley, 2005a; Hein and 
Treeck, 2007; Lavoie, 2007; Skott and Ryoo, 2007). This literature focuses on the growth 
effects of increased indebtedness, increases in the profit share, shifts in income away 
from workers, and lower retained profits of corporations. The emerging consensus is that 
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these factors tend to reduce the long run equilibrium growth rate. However, this 
conclusion is sensitive to assumptions about the response of aggregate demand to 
changes in come the profit share, In particular, if investment responds strongly to an 
increased profit share and consumption is little affected by a lowered wage share, then 
growth can increase as a result of an increased profit share. 
Corporate behavior  
A second conduit for the influence of financialization is corporate behavior, 
which financial markets have worked to change so as to align with their interests. As 
discussed earlier, mainstream economic theory has played an important role via its 
construction of the issue of corporate governance as an agency problem. That 
construction has given rise to the notion of the market for corporate control, whereby 
managers are disciplined by the prospect of takeover and ouster if they fail to maximize 
profits. According to this view, financial innovations such as leveraged buyouts and 
private equity investing financed by junk bonds are market efficiency improvements that 
compel managers to satisfy the interests of shareholders, who are the owners.  
The agency approach to corporate governance has also fostered the growth of 
stock option pay, the reasoning being that options serve to align the interests of 
management with those of shareholders. Top management has benefited from these new 
pay practices and stock options have given managers an interest in maximizing the short-
term stock price, which also benefits financial market money managers. However, it is 
not clear that shareholders have benefited as the costs of top management pay have 
become staggeringly large (Bebchuck and Grinstein, 2005) and the long term profitability 
of companies may have been prejudiced by the focus on the short-term share price. 
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This realignment of corporate manager interests to coincide with those of 
financial markets has been facilitated by the destruction of union power. This has 
removed a countervailing force that previously prevented managers from siding 
excessively with financial interests. 
Corporations have also been encouraged to adopt a cult of debt finance. One 
reason is the tax code, which treats interest payments more favorably than profits. A 
second reason is that managers may have used debt as a tactic to drain free cash flow out 
of firms, thereby putting pressure on workers and leaving less for other claimants on the 
firms’ income stream (Bronars and Deere, 1991). A third reason is that debt financing 
increases leverage, thereby potentially raising the rate of return on equity capital. Such 
financial engineering fits with the Wall Street agenda that has demanded corporations 
earn higher rates of return.  
The net result of these developments is that corporate behavior has become 
increasingly dominated by and beholden to financial markets. That means corporate 
managers may have imported the behaviors of financial markets, which has impacted 
corporate investment and business decision-making. From an agency theory perspective 
this is the desired outcome. However, it may not be good for corporations or the economy 
if financial market behaviors are governed by short-termism (Palley, 1995) and herd 
behavior (Palley, 1997b). Moreover, it may simply shift the agency problem from 
corporate managers to money managers in financial markets.  
Evidence for these effects of financialization on corporate behavior is provided by 
changes in the patterns of corporate financial behavior. Figure 4 shows nominal new 
equity issuance and new credit market borrowing of non-financial corporations for the 
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period 1959 – 2006. The striking feature is the abrupt change in the pattern of new equity 
issuance that turned negative after 1980. Post 1980, rather than being a net source of 
finance, the stock market has been a net drain of finance.  
Figure 5 shows non-financial corporate new borrowing and equity issuance as a 
percent of non-residential investment spending. This gives an indication of the scale of 
equity buy-backs, which reached 43.9 percent of non-residential investment spending in 
2006. Post-1980, new borrowing and equity purchases exhibit a clear negative correlation 
that is indicative of how firms have borrowed to finance equity buy-backs. This new 
pattern suggests changed purpose of corporate borrowing. Before 1980 it financed 
investment spending, but since 1980 a significant portion of borrowing appears to be for 
purposes of equity buy-backs. This contributes to raising the debt-equity ratio. 
These patterns fit with the financialization thesis. Financial markets tend to prefer 
that corporations use debt to finance their activities owing to its tax advantages and the 
higher rates of return on equity that leverage allows. Financial markets have also 
supported corporations paying management with stock options, which requires 
purchasing the underlying stock. Additionally, rather than paying dividends that are 
highly taxed, markets prefer corporations to use profits to re-purchase stock, which drives 
up the stock price and generates lower-taxed capital gains. Finally, increased debt 
issuance transforms profit streams into interest payment streams, which reduces corporate 
income available for other non-financial claimants.  
Economic policy  
The third conduit of financialization is economic policy. Financial sector interests, 
supported by other business interests, have promoted a policy framework favoring their 
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agenda. That framework has uncuffed financial markets and facilitated their expansion, 
and it has also helped corporations shift income from labor to capital to the benefit of 
financial sector interests. The new policy framework has been designed to reverse the 
decline in rates of return to capital that occurred in the 1970s. Thus, short-term three-
month real interest rates that were negative for much of the 1970s have been raised to 
approximately two-and-half percent. Likewise, as shown in Table 11, pre- and after-tax 
profit rates have been pushed up significantly from 1979 lows.  
The new policy framework can be termed the neo-liberal box, the effect of which 
is to box in workers.4 The box is shown in Figure 6, and it has four sides labeled 
globalization, small government, labor market flexibility, and abandonment of full 
employment, Workers are inside the box. 
“Globalization” refers to the collection of policies associated with free trade, 
capital mobility, multi-national business, and global sourcing. It also includes the 
Washington Consensus development policy that spread the neo-liberal box agenda 
globally, thereby multiplying the agenda’s impact and also establishing a dynamic of 
deregulatory competition across countries. In this regard, there is a strong international 
dimension to financialization that centers on the elimination of capital controls and 
encouraging all countries to deregulate their internal financial markets. 
“Small government” refers to the attack on the legitimacy of government activity, 
privatization, tax cuts that shrink the public revenue base, and deregulation – including 
financial sector deregulation. The small government agenda also covers policies 
regarding pension reform and saving. These policies have strongly encouraged a 
                                                 
4 The idea of describing policy with the metaphor of a box is attributable to Ron Blackwell of the AFL-
CIO. 
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movement away from providing retirement income through group defined benefit 
pension plans to individual defined contribution arrangements such as 401(k) retirement 
saving plans. These new plans advance financial interests in several ways. First, they 
generate large fee income through charges for custodial services and brokerage 
commissions. Second, they increase individual investor demand for equities, which 
boosts equity prices. Third, they create an investor identity among households that then 
generates favorable political support for policies favored by large financial interests. 
 The small government agenda has also spawned a version of public sector 
financialization through plutocratic tax cuts. These tax cuts have lowered higher bracket 
income taxes and taxes on income from capital and created large budget deficits. Table 
12 shows that the publicly held debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 20.8 percent of GDP in 1973 
to 36.9 percent in 2005, while government interest payments as a share of total revenues 
rose from 7.5 percent to 15.6 percent. This increase in public debt and debt service was 
particularly marked in the 1980s under the Reagan administration. The one period of 
exception was the Clinton administration in the 1990s that pursued small government 
policies, but in the context of a balanced budget.  
“Labor market flexibility” refers to the agenda for weakening unions and eroding 
labor market supports such as the minimum wage, unemployment benefits, employment 
protections, and employee rights. This agenda has dominated U.S. labor market policy, 
and it has also been the source of heated political debate in Europe.5  
Finally. “abandonment of full employment” refers to changed priorities regarding 
macroeconomic policy, which elevated the significance of low inflation and reduced the 
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significance of full employment. This shift of focus toward low inflation has been 
implemented through policies of inflation targeting and central bank independence, both 
of which are supported by financial interests (Epstein, 2001; Palley, 1996b). 
Additionally, there is evidence that central banks have raised interest rates in economies 
with high union density despite the lack of any evidence that higher union density is 
associated with higher inflation (Palley, 2005b).  
The policy configuration described by the neo-liberal box challenges workers 
from all sides, and it puts continuous downward pressure on wages. This helps explain 
why wages have become detached from productivity growth, and why income inequality 
has increased. Private sector workers are challenged by the box’s globalization agenda; 
public sector workers are challenged by the small government agenda; and all workers 
are challenged by the labor market flexibility agenda and the abandonment of full 
employment as the primary goal of macroeconomic policy. 
V Financialization and the new business cycle 
The combination of increased access to credit in financial markets and the new 
policy framework described by the neo-liberal box, have together created a new business 
cycle since 1980 (Palley, 2005c). The business cycles of Presidents Ronald Reagan, 
George H. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, all share strong similarities and are 
distinctly different from pre-1980 business cycles.  These similarities are an over-valued 
dollar, trade deficits, disinflation or low inflation, manufacturing job loss, asset price 
(equities and housing) inflation, widening income inequality, detachment of worker 
wages from productivity growth, and rising household and corporate indebtedness. 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Conventional economic theory charges that higher European unemployment rates are the result of rigid 
labor markets. Post Keynesian analysis maintains that the principle cause of higher European 
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The foundation of the new business cycle is financial boom and cheap imports. 
Financial boom and asset price inflation provide consumers and firms with collateral to 
support debt-financed spending. Borrowing is also supported by steady financial 
innovation that ensures a flow of new financial products allowing increased leverage and 
widening the range of assets that can be collateralized. Additionally, credit standards 
have been lowered in recent years, which has made credit even more easily available to 
households, firms and financial investors. Meanwhile, cheap imports ameliorate the 
impacts of wage stagnation, widening income inequality, manufacturing job loss and 
increased economic insecurity. 
This structure contrasts with the pre-1980 business cycle that rested on wage 
growth tied to productivity growth and full employment. Wage growth, rather than 
borrowing, fuelled consumption and demand growth. That then encouraged investment 
spending, which in turn drove productivity and output growth 
The differences between the new and old business cycle are starkly revealed by 
policy attitudes toward the trade deficit. Prior to 1980 trade deficits were viewed as a 
serious problem, being a demand leakage that undermined the virtuous circle of robust 
domestic demand and output growth. Post-1980, trade deficits have been viewed as the 
outcome of choices made by consenting economic agents, and they help maximize well-
being. For the Federal Reserve, trade deficits help with inflation control; and for 
politicians they help buy-off consumers who face wage stagnation. 
 Finally, the new business cycle tacitly embeds a new monetary policy stance that 
replaces concern with real wages with concern about asset prices. Whereas pre-1980 
policy tacitly focused on putting a floor under labor markets to preserve employment and 
                                                                                                                                                 
unemployment is macroeconomic policy failure (Palley, 1998b, 2005b). 
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wages, now policy tacitly puts a floor under asset prices. This policy behavior has been 
clearly visible with the 2007 U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis. It is not a case of the Fed 
intentionally bailing out investors. Rather, the macro economy is now vulnerable to asset 
price declines so that the Fed is obliged to step in to prevent such declines from inflicting 
broad macroeconomic damage. However, that has the twin consequence of bailing out 
investors and also potentially creating investor moral hazard. Such moral hazard 
encourages investors to chase even greater high risk – return ventures because they know 
there is a good chance they will be bailed out by the Fed if things go wrong. 
 Moreover, the Fed itself may suffer from cognitive dissonance about this. On one 
hand good policy requires that investors bear the financial costs of bad decision-making. 
On the other hand, the macroeconomic system created by financialization may require 
rising indebtedness and asset prices to maintain growth. Consequently, not only does the 
Fed have reason to prevent asset price declines, it also has reason to engage in serial 
blowing of asset price bubbles. That certainly appears to be the lesson of the 2001–06 
house price bubble. 
VI What can be done? 
Financialization and the new business cycle it has spawned raise serious concerns. 
Economic growth has been tepid, median wages have stagnated, and income inequality 
and economic insecurity have both risen. Moreover, there are concerns that the business 
cycle generated by financialization may be unstable and end in prolonged stagnation. 
Remedying these failings requires a fundamental change of policy paradigm so as to 
reconfigure the balance of economic power and the dynamic behind the business cycle. 
Financial markets are at the heart of the financialization process, and that suggests 
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there is an urgent need to restore effective control over these markets. Today, the only 
effective policy tool that monetary authorities have is the short-term interest rate. 
However, that tool is a blunt instrument, equivalent to a blunderbuss. Thus, attempts to 
curtail financial speculation by raising interest rates can inflict serious collateral damage 
on the real economy. This suggests complementing interest rate policy with a new 
financial sector regulatory framework based on asset based reserve requirements 
(ABRR).6 Such a framework can help stabilize financial markets and provide additional 
tool of monetary policy to supplement interest rate policy. 
 The policy framework described by the neo-liberal box also constitutes a key 
element of the financialization program. That points to the need to challenge all sides of 
the box, and calls for restoring restore full employment policy (Palley, 2007b); replacing 
the current corporate globalization with a globalization that allows policy space and 
equitable development; replacing the small government agenda with a progressive “better 
government” agenda; and replacing the labor market flexibility agenda with a good jobs 
and productive workplaces agenda. 
Changed corporate behavior is another key part of financialization, with 
corporations being increasingly governed by the diktats of financial markets. Dealing 
with corporations involves three distinct different policy agendas. One agenda is the 
mainstream corporate accountability agenda that emphasizes reining in excessive CEO 
pay, lack of corporate accountability, and misaligned incentives within firms. In a sense, 
this agenda recognizes that developments in corporate governance over the last twenty 
years have actually aligned the interests of top managers and money managers, rather 
than the interests of top managers and shareholders. A second larger agenda concerns 
                                                 
6 The workings of a system based on ABRR and its advantages are described by Palley (2000, 2003, 2004). 
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reframing the legal purpose and obligations of corporations so that they also take into 
account interests of stakeholders other than just shareholders (Blair and Stout, 1999). A 
third agenda is how to align the incentives of money managers so that these managers 
represent the interests of savers in mutual funds. 
Finally, policy has played a critical role advancing financialization, and policy is 
significantly driven by politics and lobbying. That simple observation means political 
reform is also needed. In particular, there is need to address the political power of 
financial and non-financial corporations, as well as wealthy individuals. Addressing this 
problem will require tackling issues of lobbying and the influence of wealth on politics. It 
also concerns the way the democratic political process is organized. That includes 
disclosure requirements for politicians. It also may require changing the rules of 
elections, perhaps replacing current “winner take all” arrangements with forms of 
proportional representation that can give greater voice to those without resources. The 
reality is that economic power affects politics, and politics affects economic policy and 
economic outcomes, in turn impacting economic power. That means politics and 
economic policy need to be linked, rather than being seen as independent spheres as has 
historically been the case.  
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Figure 1. Index of productivity and hourly compensation of production and non-supervisory workers in 
the U.S., 1959-2005. Source: Economic Policy Institute.
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Figure 2. Financialization & the Functional Distribution of 
Income
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Figure 3. Conduits of Financialization.
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Figure 4. Non financial corporation net equity issuance and new borrowing, 1959-2006.
Source: Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds, tables F2 and F4.
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Figure 5. Non-financial corporation new borrowing and net equity
issuance as percent of non-residential investment, 1959-2006.
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Figure 6. Economic Policy and the Neo-liberal box.
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Table 4. Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) output as percent of GDP.  Source: 
Economic Report of the President, Table B-12, 2007 and author’s calculations 
 
 GDP  
($ bil.) 
Finance, Insurance 
& Real Estate  
($ bil.) 
% FIRE/GDP  
1973 1,638.3 248.2 15.1% 
1979  2,563.3 390.3 15.2 
1989 5,484.4 975.4 17.8 
2000 9,817.0 1,931.0 19.7 
2005 12,455.8 2,536.1 20.4 
 
 
 
Table 5. FIRE employment as a share of total non-agricultural private sector. Source: 
Economic Report of the President, Table B-46, 2007 and author’s calculations 
 
 Private 
employment 
(millions) 
FIRE 
(millions) 
% Fire/Private  
employment 
1973 63.1 3.9 6.2% 
1979 73.9 4.8 6.6 
1989 90.1 6.6 7.3 
2000 111.0 7.7 6.9 
2005 111.7 8.1 7.3 
 
 
 
Table 6. Annual per capita income growth rates, 1960 – 2004, Source: Mishel et al. 
(2007) and author’s calculations. * = prior to 1991 includes only West Germany 
 
Country Annual 
growth 
rates (%) 
    
 1960-79 1979-2004 1979-89 1989-2000 2000-04 
U.S. 2.2% 1.9% 2.1% 1.9% 1.3% 
Japan 6.6 2.0 3.1 1.5 0.8 
Germany* 3.3 1.7 1.8 2.0 0.6 
France 3.4 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.0 
Italy 5.0 1.7 2.3 1.5 0.7 
U.K. 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 
Canada 3.0 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4 
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Table 7. Gross investment spending as a share of GDP. Source: Economic Report of the 
President, Table B-1, 2007 and author’s calculations 
 
 Fixed 
investment/GDP  
(%) 
Non-residential 
investment/GDP 
(%) 
Equipment & 
software/GDP 
(%) 
 
Residential 
investment/GDP
(%) 
1973 17.7% 11.1% 7.1% 5.4% 
1979 19.2 13.0 8.4 5.5 
1989 20.0 11.1 7.5 4.4 
2000 17.7 12.6 9.3 4.6 
2005 16.5 10.2 7.4 6.2 
 
 
Table 8.  Capital’s share. Source: Economic Report of the President, Table B-28, 2007 
and author’s calculations 
 
 Employee 
compensation  
($ bil) 
Corporate profits 
before interest  
($ bil) 
Profits before 
interest/compensation
1973 811.2 180.7 22.3% 
1979 1,500.8 362.1 24.1 
1989 3,145.2 858.7 27.3 
2000 5,782.7 1,376.9 23.8 
2005 7,030.3 1,814.1 25.8 
 
 
Table 9.  Division of capital’s share. Source: Economic Report of the President, Tables 
B-28, 2007 and author’s calculations 
 
 Corporate profits 
after interest 
($ bil.) 
Corporate interest 
Payments 
($ bil.) 
Interest as percent 
of profits 
% 
1973 125.5 55.2 44.0% 
1979 223.2 138.9 62.2 
1989 426.6 432.1 101.3 
2000 817.9 559.0 68.3 
2005 1330.7 483.4 36.3 
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Table 10. Corporate domestic industry profits (without capital consumption adjustment). 
Source: Economic Report of the President, Tables B-28 and B-91, 2007, and author’s 
calculations. 
 
 National 
income  
($ bil.) 
Financial 
sector 
profits 
($ bil.) 
Non-
financial 
profits 
($ bil.) 
Financial/
Non-
financial 
profits 
Financial 
profits/ 
GDP 
(%) 
Non-
fin.profits/ 
GDP 
(%) 
Total 
profits/
GDP 
(%) 
1973 1,247.4 20.5 79.9 0.257 1.6% 6.4% 8.0 
1979 2,249.1 40.3 156.8 0.257 1.8 7.0 8.8 
1989 4,826.6 77.9 222.3 0.350 1.6 4.6 6.2 
2000 8,795.2 203.8 409.8 0.497 2.3 4.7 7.0 
2005 10,811.8 389.0 900.1 0.432 3.6 8.3 11.9 
 
 
 
Table 11. Corporate sector profit rates. Source: Mishel et al., 2007. 
 
 Pre-tax 
profit rate 
(%) 
Post-tax 
profit rate
(%) 
1973 11.7% 7.0% 
1979 9.6 5.7 
1989 10.6 7.0 
2000 10.6 7.1 
2005 11.9 8.6 
 
 
 
Table 12. Publicly held government debt and government interest payments. Source: 
Economic Report of the President, Tables B-78 and B-80, 2007, and author’s 
calculations. 
 
 
 GDP 
($ bil.) 
Publicly 
held debt 
($ bil) 
Publicly 
held 
debt/GDP 
(%) 
Net 
interest
($ bil) 
Total 
budget 
revenues 
($ bil) 
Interest 
/Revenues
(%) 
1973 1,638.3 340.9 20.8% 17.3 230.8 7.5% 
1979 2,563.3 640.3 25.0 42.6 463.3 9.2 
1989 5,484.4 2,190.7 39.9 169.0 991.2 17.1 
2000 9,817.0 3,409.8 34.7 239.9 2025.5 11.8 
2005 12,455.8 4,592.2 36.9 339.3 2153.9 15.6 
Table 1. Credit market debt outstanding. Source: Economic Report of the President, Table B-1; Flow of Funds, Table L.1, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, September 17, 2007; and author’s calculations. 
 
 GDP 
($ bils.) 
Total credit 
market debt 
($ bils.) 
Total 
credit/GDP 
(%) 
Financial sector 
debt 
($ bils.) 
Financial sector 
debt/Total debt 
(%) 
Non-financial 
sector 
debt/Total debt 
(%) 
1973 1,382.7 2,172.7 140.0% 209.8 9.7% 90.3% 
1979 2,563,3 4,276.4 166.8 504.9 11.8 88.2 
1989 5,484.4 12,838.7 234.1 2,399.3 18.7 81.3 
2000 9,187.0 27,019.6 294.1 8,130.3 30.1 69.9 
2005 12,455.8 40,926.0 328.6 12,905.2 31.5 68.5 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Domestic non-financial sector debt.  Source: Economic Report of the President, Tables B-69, B-75 and B-77, 2007, and 
author’s calculations. 
 
 
 GDP 
($ bil.) 
Debt of 
domestic 
non-fin. 
Sectors 
($ bil) 
Consumer 
revolving 
credit 
($ bil) 
Debt-x- 
Revolving 
credit 
($ bil.) 
Debt-x- 
revolving 
credit/GDP
(%) 
Mortgage  
debt 
($ bil.) 
Mortgage 
debt/GDP 
(%) 
Debt-x- 
Revolving 
credit-x- 
mortgage 
($ bil.) 
Debt-x- 
revolving-x- 
mortgage/GDP
(%) 
1973 1,382.7 1,895.5 11.3 1,884.2 136.3% 673.4 48.7% 1,210.8 87.6% 
1979 2,563.3 3,603.0 53.6 3,549.4 138.5 1,330.0 51.9 2,219.4 86.6 
1989 5,484.4 10,156.7 211.2 9,945.5 181.3 3,591.3 65.5 6,354.2 115.8 
2000 9,187.0 18,091.2 683.0 17,408.2 189.5 6,795.2 74.0 10,613.0 115.5 
2005 12,455.8 26,647.1 826.6 25,820.5 207.3 12,148.7 97.5 13,671.8 109.8 
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Table 3. Composition of domestic non-financial sector debt. Source: Economic Report of the President, Table B-1; Flow of Funds, 
Table L.1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, September 17, 2007; and author’s calculations. 
 
 GDP 
($ bil.) 
Debt of 
domestic 
non-fin. 
sector 
($ bil) 
Non-
fin. 
Corp 
debt 
($ bil) 
Household 
sector 
debt 
($ bil) 
Non-fin. 
Corp 
debt/GDP 
(%) 
Household 
debt/GDP 
(%) 
Non-fin. Corp 
debt/Domestic 
non-fin. debt 
(%) 
Household 
debt/Domestic 
non-fin. debt 
(%) 
1973 1,638.3 1,895.5 495.6 624.9 30.3% 45.2% 26.2% 33.0% 
1979 2,563.3 3,603.0 843.8 1,276.1 32.9 49.8 23.4 35.4 
1989 5,484.4 10,156.7 2,401.3 3,335.9 43.8 60.8 23.6 32.8 
2000 9,817.0 18,091.2 4,530.7 7,008..8 46.2 76.3 25.0 38.7 
2005 12,455.8 26,647.1 5,285.0 11,707.0 42.4 94.0 19.8 43.9 
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